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NET INCOME AND JUDICIAL ECONOMICS

A

LEGAL system does not function in a vacuum of abstractions. It is part of a general institutional framework of an
organized society. Its content is determined by concrete individual
and social needs and activities. Hence modern jurisprudence conceives of law as a means for securing interests. The appraisal of
its rules and principles requires an evaluation of the significant
elements of the situation to which they apply. A narrow, complacent formalism is the penalty of failure in this regard. No one
would deny the emphasis modern society places upott its commercial and industrial interests, nor the many points of contact between
its legal and economic systems. Their problems are so inextricably
interwoven that the proper answer to questions of law frequently
turns on correct economic analysis. If the advent of income taxes
has done nothing else, it has at least forcibly emphasized that fact.
One phase of this inter-relation will be considered in the following
discussion, namely, the determination of legal rights involving
questions of income.
The income question with which courts deal most frequently is,
what constitutes net income. This is a fairly definite concept to
the economist and accountant. To them it denotes an objective
fact, mathematically ascertainable by applying to the financial facts
of operation for a given period a formula of recognized accounting
practice. It connotes a definite order of arranging those facts in
accordance with economic principles: first, the summation of the
items that make up gross income; next, the deduction of outlaysI
properly chargeable in arriving at net income; and last, the disposition of net income.
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The principal defect of the legal treatment of income questions
has been due to a failure to distinguish between the last two. The
difference between them can be explained by applying the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Commission's accounting classi. fications to a concrete case. If a railroad constructs new mileage
out of current earnings, it is not permitted to show the cost as a
deduction in computing its net income, but must show it as an
appropriation of net income. The distinction was recognized in
G. R. {7 I. Ry. Co. v. Doyle1 (a tax case), 1n the-following language:
"It is a well-known fact that corporations in general, both railway and manufacturing companies, often use a part of their net
earning~ or income in the extension and improvement of their
plants and property and business. * * * But amounts so expended
in additions are no less income than they would be if paid to the
stockholder as dividends."
The proper constituent elements of gross income have received
practically no discussion in judicial opinions except in tax cases,
which have not been considered herein. The problem frequently
arises in receiverships where the receiver, without adopting the
lease, continues to operate leased properties during the trial period
allowed by ·1aw. The receiver is held under such circumstances
to ·satisfy his entire duty by turning over to the lessor the entire
net earnings of the demised premises. The net earnings of a leased
railroad cannot be correctly computed without imputing to it its
proper share of the gross earnings from joint traffic. This question was squarely raised in a case involving a railroad lease under
which the rent was to be increased as soon as the "gross revenues"
of the , leased road exceeded a stipulated sum. The leased lines
were operated as an integral part of the lessee's system, and the
lessor's right to the increa~ed rental depended ultimately upon
fixing a proper measure for the division of the receipts from joint
traffic. Unfortunately for this discussion, the case was ultimately
settled out of court. Courts have usually held that, in income bond
cases, the obligor may not mingle the accounts of the mortgaged
property with those of the system of which it is a part. The application of this rule raises the identical question. The decisions
point out the situations in which the problem arises, but give no
1

245 Fed. j92.
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clue to the solution. The Interstate Commerce Commission has
frequently dealt with the same or analogous questions in passing
on the division of through rates, proportional rates and switching
charges. Its rulings would assuredly have weight with any court
confronted with the situations suggested in this paragraph, but are
beyond the scope of this treatment. In the absence of definite
decisions on the first phase of income determination, the cases
analyzed are limited to those involving the propriety of income
charges and the differentiation between capital and expense.
The distinction between capital and expense was called a "fundamental" one in. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. U. S.2 That case
involved the validity of certain accounting regulations of the InterState Commerce Commission, requiring the estimated replacement
cost (less salvage value) of property abandoned as an incident to
making permanent improvements to be charged to operating
expenses. The company contended that, due to the extensive abandonment of property incident to shifting part of its line to improve
the gradient, the regulation would so reduce the year's net earnings as to render necessary the suspension of dividends on its pref erred stock. It wished to charge the abandoned property to profit
and loss, the accumulateq earnings of the past. The regulation was
alleged to be so unreasonable as to constitute a violation of the
Fifth Amendment. In discussing this aspect of the case the court
said:
"We are thus brought back to the fundamental distinction
between (a) property or capital accounts, designed to represent the investment of the stockholders, and to show the
cost of the property as originally acquired, with subsequent
additions and improvements ; these assets being balanced by
the liabilities, including the amount of the capital stock and
of bonded and other indebtedness, with net profits or surplus, whether carried under the head of 'profit and loss' or
otherwise; and (b) the operating accounts, designed to show,
on the one side, gross receipts or gross earnings for the year,
and on the other side, the expenditures involved in producing
those gross earnings and in maintaining __ the property, the
balance being net earnings."
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Although admitting that the alternative treatment contended for
by the carrier might be equally reasonable, it held that the regulation was not invalid. It recognized the absolute necessity of making
and observing the distinction between capital and expense for the
Commission's proper performance of its regulatory duties.
The public interest in rate cases requires that fundamental distinction to be carefully adhered to. The control now exercised
over the accounts of public service industries by public boards has
universally enforced its observance. Before the day of such effective supervision, courts uniformly protected those interests by
closely following correct accounting principles: The reasonable
rate which the public can be required to pay must cover all operating expenses and provide in addition a fair return on the property
devoted to its use. Justice to the public demands the rigorous
exclusion of capital expenditures from operating expenses ; and
r~quires that permanent accretions to property paid for out of earnings be charged to income after, not before, reaching the net return.
Every expenditure for additions and betterments increases the rate
base pari passu, whether it is included in operating expenses or not.
Their inclusion therein merely builds up a secret reserve of property not shown among the book as$ets. If book figures were taken
as conclusive evidence of fair value in rate cases, the only injury
to the public would be the overcharge made in the first instance.
Contemporary appraisals are, however, always relied on to establish such values, and these inevitably include the property built up
through loading the expense accounts with capital items. No case
has yet held that property thus acquired is not to be considered in
determining the rate base. Unless expense charges are rigorously
limited to true expense items, the public may find itself compelled
to pay a fair return on what is in substance its own capital contribution. Because expenditures for additions and improvements
"increased the value of the company's property to the extent of
such expenditures," they were thrown out of operating expenses
in Catting v. Kansas City Stockyards, 3 and practically every later
rate case. The rule does not prohibit a public service company
3 82 Fed. 850.
Cons. Gas. Co. v. N. Y., 157 Fed. 849; Spring Valley
Water Works v. San Francisco, 192 Fed. 137.
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from using its earnings for additions ; it merely requires them to
be paid for with its own share.
The proper observance of this separation is necessary not only
to protect the public against the companies, but also to secure a
fair distribution of the burden of capital costs as between different
consumers. The essential fact about capital is that it gives off a
series of services extending over more than a single income period.
It squares better with the equities of the situation to require its
cost to be borne by all users of those services than to load it on
those that use them during the period when the outlay is made.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. I. C. C. :4
"On principle it would seem * * * as if expenditures for additions
to construction and equipment, as expenditures for original construction and equipment, should be reimbursed by all of the traffic
they accommodate during the period of their duration, and that
improvements that will last many years should not be charged
wholly against the revenues of a single year." On the whole, where
public rights have turned on the proper analysis of income questions,
courts have acquitted themselves very creditably.
The picture is not as uniformly favorable when considering cases
in which purely private claims were contingent on income factors.
These most often involved the rights of various classes of corporate security holders to interest or dividends. The income bond
cases furnish the best illustrative material. The distinctive characteristic of an income bond is that the payment of interest is contingent upon the e:>.."1stence of net income. It was frequently issued
to junior lien holders in railroad reorganizations. The interest
was invariably non-cumulative. The psychological effect of calling
it a bond was to induce in the owner a feeling of security that subsequent events usually belied. It was a standing temptation to
corporate officials to perpetrate what, if not actual legal fraud, was
a close blood relation. This, coupled with the perfunctory manner
in which the mortgage trustee usually performed its duties, resulted
in controversies that ultimately landed in the courts.
The federal court for the western district of Louisiana recently
passed on the right of income bondholders to interest under the
4

206 U. S. 44r.
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following state of facts." The Texas & Pacific Railway Company
had issued a series of such bonds pursuant to the reorganization
agreement of 1886. The mortgage securing it provided for the
payment of interest "out of the net income of the Railway Company, as the same may be determined by the board of directors."
In casting the income account to determine whether there was any
net income, the di;ectors charged it with all manner of capital items.
These were generally concealed among the operating expenses until
the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission made that
practice;! illegal. Thereafter income was appropriated for capital
r.equirements prior to arriving at what the company considered net
income under .the bond and mortgage. These facts were not denied.
The contract was s;onstrued as vesting the directors "with discretion to determine that the net income of the road was such portion
of the gross earnings as might remain unexpended after the pressing needs of the road had been taken care of."
The directors were held not to have been "reduced to the level
of auditors and bookkeepers to mathematically determine what is
net income, according to the theoretical dictum of expert accountants." This conclusion was based in part upon the argument that
safety and economy of operation, the charter duties of the company
to the public, and the mortgage provisions themselves required the
road to be improved and built up, and that a company whose borrowing powers were exhausted could do these things only out of
earnings.. The mortgage provisions relied on were the usual mortgagor's covenants found in such instruments, whether securing
income or fixed interest bonds. They have never before been interpreted as intended to define the contingency on which interest was
payable on income bonds, and owe their importance in this case to
an illogical application of the rule that the intention of the parties
is to be gathered "from the four corners of the instrument." The
bondholders must have inten.ded the directors to have that power,
says the court, because at the time of issue it was apparent that
'interest could not be earned for some time to come, and perhaps
not at all unless the road were improved. Had the court realized
5 B. F. Bush, Receiver, v. The Texas & Pac. R. R. Co., not officially
reported.
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the full implication of its decision on the economic interests of the
bondholders, it could not have been convinced by its own arguments.
The decision shows that general principles -not only do not solve
concrete cases, but may even afford a convenient protection against
the necessity of a too rigorous analysis of difficult technical points.
Substantial rights and interests are always sacrificed whei;i. abstract'
principles are formally applied in disregard of the actualities of
the situation. If net income is what this court says it is, it becomes
a variable function of directorial discretion, and the creditor's
right to interest is made to depend on _the debtor's will and judgment, subject only to the limits of non-fraudulent dealing. This
is a correct statement of the powers of directors over the declaration of dividends on stock; their duty towards income bondholders
should in fairness be measured by some more objective standard.
The consequences of such a subjective test on the relative economic
positions of the income bondholders and stockholders are so contrary to current notions of justice that reason dictates its adoption
only as a last resort. The case of Edwards v. International Pavement Co. 6 involved a bond in which the definition of net income
violated every correct principle. The bond expressly authorized
the directors to deduct every outlay, whether for expense or capital purposes, in determining net income. Nothing can be done in
such a case to protect those who have incorporated their folly in
contract form. The folly of one should not, however, be made the
measure of the rights of wiser and more careful bargainers; nor
should a presumption exist in construing a contract that the parties
intended a fool's bargain. If one interpretation produces results
both reasonable and just, and another the opposite effects, it is
neither good law nor sense to adopt the latter. The court in the
Texas & Pacific case was confronted with that alternative; it chose
the worse position. This will be apparent from a consideration
of the following implications of its doctrine.
Income bondholders are creditors, not stockholders. No one
would dispute the proposition that they did not loan their capital
from motives of philanthropy, but solely to get an income. It is
equally certain that, given parties of fairly equal bargaining skill
a 227 Mass. 2o6.
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and power, a lender would not contract to waive interest during
the time that the borrower was increasing his wealth through the
use of the former's capital. A definition that permits the deduction of capital expenditures in computing the net income by which
the duty to pay interest is fixed converts an income bond into just
such an agreement. At the beginning of any income period the
corporate assets amount to a given sum contributed by both the
bondholders and stockholders. The balance of the gross earnings
from operation after deducting operating expenses and fixed
charges-that is, those outlays for which the corporation receives
assets that are entirely consumed during the period in producing
those earnings-constitute net additions to corporate property. It
is immaterial in what form this increment is retained; its application to capital improvements represents a mere conversion in the
form of assets, neither increasing nor decreasing them.
Permitting capital expenditures to be deducted in arriving at net
income is thus equivalent to authorizing the debtor to retain for its
own uses an equal part of the net property accretion for the period,
to appropriate to itself a part of the true net earnings. The
debtor could avoid the payment of interest during the entire life
of the bonds by carrying on a sufficiently large program of additions and improvements. It would thus secure the free use of the
c_apital of others, not only while increasing its own wealth, but just
because of that fact. A portion 9f the annual earnings might conceivably be reserved to provide a sinking fund to retire the income
·bonds at maturity, and creditors thus be compelled to pay the principal of their claim with what they would otherwise have received
as interest. The doctrine affects the debtor's position as favorably
as it affects the creditor's adversely. The retention of the net earnings pari passit increases corporate surplus or decreases the deficit,
and proportionately enhances the real value of the stock. This
constitutes as real a receipt of the retained or reinvested earnings
by the stockholder as if they had been distributed as dividends.
The surplus belongs to him, and can subsequently be capitalized
by a stock dividend.
Thus the creditor's claim for interest is subordinated to that of
the stockholder to appropriate the first fruits of the venture in
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which their joint capital is embarked. The bondholder benefits
only in the increased security of his principal, a reason sometimes
alleged to justify the doctrine. The argument rests on a misconception in the case of long term bonds, except during the last ten
or fifteen years of their life. The present value of the principal of
such bonds is less than the present value of the series of interest
payments e.'>:cept during such later period, the length of which varies
with the discount rate applied. The argument, therefore, imputes
to the bondholders a willingness to sacrifice the greater for the less.
The foregoing analysis of the implications of the doctrine here discussed shows its absurdity.
•
Some of the arguments of the preceding paragraph were clearly
stated by the supreme court of Georgia in Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v.
The Central Trust Co. of New York. 1 It discussed the company's
right to deduct additions and betterments in arriving at net income
in the following language:
"Relatively to stockholders, directors have a broad discretion in the application of income to the improvement of corporate property, instead of apportioning some of it to dividends. But an income bondholder, whose interest is only
payable from the net income of the year in which the interest
accrues, occupies a more favored position than that of a
stockholder. A diversion of net income to betterments and
expansion of the physical properties to the withholding of
an annual dividend does not mean a loss to the stockholder,
as the stockholder indirectly gets the dividend in the presently enhanced value of his stock. The bondholder, whose
right to interest is immediate, which interest is forever lost
if not paid from the income of the year in which the interest
accrues, derives no present benefit from the diversion of
income to betterments, but sustains a loss so far as interest
is concerned, which can never be recouped. Even if the payment of the principal of his debt is better assured by successive diversions of income, the income, if not paid, is for7 135 Ga. 472.
Other income bond cases discussing various aspects of
this question are: Barry v. M., K & T. Ry. Co., 27 Fed. I; Id., 34 Fed. 829;
Hubbard v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 200 Fed. 504; Yazoo & M. V.
R. Co. v. Martin, 47 So. 667; Id., 4~ So. 739·
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ever lost. And then, too, a bond payable 50 years hence has
practically no commercial value unless there is some assur:.
ance of interest pending its maturity."
This language reflects a clear perception of the importance of a
correct definition of net income on the financial interests of the
parties. Creditors do not usually bargain for such results. A judicial construction of a contract that produces them is almost certain
to rest on.: incorrect analysis. The Georgia court did not reject "the
refinements of later day theories," but made them a measure of
directorial powers in dealing with the interests of contingent creditors. It observed the distinction between capital and expense.
Expenditures for enlarging the plant, equipment trust payments
in excess of the depreciation on the equipment' covered by the agreements, and amounts reserved for sinking funds were all disallowed
as deductions in computing net income under the bond. No one
will question that this decision accords better with current notions
of justice than that in the other case, that it appraises the equities
of the situation with a. finer regard for fair business dealing and a
better grasp of fundamentals.
The "interests of income bondholders and others with rights contingent on net income have . usually been defeated through the
improper correlation of two problems. Courts frequently stress
the point in such cases that directors, as practical men, retain their
authority to build up the mortgaged property. Such is the undoubted
rule in the absence of specific contract limitations. 8 That, however,
does not logically mean that they have the power to charge the
expenditures incurred in exercising that authority in any manner
they see fit. To deduce the fatter power from the former authority
involves a vicious non sequitur, based on an incorrect understanding
of what is meant by determining net income. The two questions
are frequently confused and identified. The one involves considerations of business policy; the other is concerned with the manner
of recording the financial results of such policies. A contract may
very well leave directors full discretion in respect of the former
8 Spies v. C. & E. I. R. Co., 40 Fed. 34; Day v. 0. & L. E. R. Co., 107
N. Y. 129. In connection with the Day case, see also Thomas v. N. Y. &
G. L. R. Co., 139 N. Y. 163; Buell v. B. & 0. S, W.R. Co., 53 N. Y. S. 749.
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and yet impose limits in regard to the latter. The first essential to
the correct determination of. the rights of income bondholders and
those in similar circumstances is to make the above distinction. The
court made it in Mackintosh v. Flint & P. M. R. Co.9 in the following language: "The policy thus adopted and pursued by the
actual management assumed that the contingent rights and interests
of the provisional certificate· holders were entirely subject to the
discretion of the directors, or those in control of the road, in deciding, not only what expenditures should be made, but how they
should be charged, as between operating and construction." Where
the two are confused the second is almost invariably answered
incorrectly. The absence of specific limitations in respect of what
expenditures may be made is construed as blanket authority to
charge them at will. The definite limitation on the power to charge
expenditures that the term net income itself implies receives no
recognition, and thus the most effective guaranty of justice to contingent creditors is lost.
It is usual to give the grounds for a particular approach to a
subject at the beginning rather than at the close of the discussion.
This order has been deliberately reversed in the belief that the reasons would be more easily stated and better understood by adopting
that course. No definition of income, gross or net, emerges from
the analysis of the cases reviewed; none was intended. The aim
has been to present a picture of the process of translating economic
fact into legal rule. The effectiveness of law as a social instrument
varies directly with the extent to which it takes account of the extralegal factors of the situation that it aims to control. The rules it
prescribes for economic relations will conform to accepted and wellfounded views of justice about in proportion as correct economic
analysis contributes to their content. That is as ,true of other economico-legal problems as of that one herein selected for illustrative
purposes, for the relation between law and economics is a subject
9 34 Fed. 582.
It is this that explains the statement of the New York
court in the Day case, note 8, supra, that the bond was "at most an agreement to pay dividends if dividends are earned," and the <lecision in the
Texas & Pacific case, text, supra, that no interest was payable if the earnings had been applied by the -directors to additions and betterments authorized by them.
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with ramifications as extensive as the points of contact between the
legal and economic systems of modern society are numerous and
diverse.
Of the New York Bar.
HENRY Ro'l'TSCHAEFER.

